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MARYLAND V. KING: THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT SPIRALS DOWN THE 
DOUBLE HELIX 
SITARA V. WITANACHCHI* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Maryland v. King,1 the United States Supreme Court will 
consider the constitutionality of Maryland’s DNA Collection Act (the 
Act),2 which enables law enforcement to obtain DNA samples of 
arrestees, enter the samples into a database, and compare the samples 
to unknown DNA profiles for possible matches.3 Specifically, the 
Court will consider whether DNA testing individuals arrested for 
violent crimes violates the Fourth Amendment right to freedom from 
unreasonable search and seizure.4 The novelty of the question before 
the Court comes from the Act’s application to arrestees5—the Court 
will examine the nature of arrestees’ privacy expectations as 
implicated by DNA testing. The Court will also consider the efficacy 
of DNA testing as a law enforcement tool as well as its facilitation of 
compelling government interests—resolving unsolved crimes and 
aiding the law enforcement efforts of other states and of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. Upon balancing arrestees’ privacy interests 
against the government’s interests in obtaining arrestees’ DNA, the 
Court will likely find the government’s interests to be stronger. Thus, 
the Court will hold post-arrest DNA testing reasonable and the Act 
constitutional within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Professors Joseph 
Blocher and Nita Farahany for their guidance and support. I thank the members of DJCLPP, in 
particular Tara McGrath and Jonathan Rash, for their insight and careful editing. 
 1.  Maryland v. King, No. 12-207 (U.S. argued Feb. 26, 2013). 
 2.  DNA Collection Act, MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3) (West 2013). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, No. 12-207 (U.S. argued Feb. 26, 2013) 
(Alito, J.) (“[B]y the way, I think this is perhaps the most important criminal procedure case 
that this Court has heard in decades.”). 
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In September 2003, Vonette W. was raped and robbed in her home 
by an unidentified individual.6 The recovered semen was submitted 
for analysis to discover the perpetrator’s DNA profile.7 The resulting 
profile did not match any pre-existing DNA profiles in the state or 
federal databases.8 
In April 2009, respondent Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested for an 
unrelated incident in Wicimico County, Maryland,9 and charged with 
first- and second-degree assault.10 Under the Act, an arrestee charged 
with a crime of violence must provide a buccal swab for DNA 
testing;11 because first-degree assault constitutes a crime of violence, 
King was required to submit to a buccal swab.12 King’s DNA profile 
was obtained from this swab and submitted to the FBI’s DNA 
database system,13 known as CODIS.14 It was then compared to 
unmatched DNA samples on file.15 King’s DNA profile matched the 
previously unidentified DNA recovered following the rape of Vonette 
W.16 King was ultimately charged with the rape and robbery of 
Vonette W.17 
At trial, King raised a constitutional challenge to the Act, arguing 
that requiring an arrestee to submit to a buccal swab constitutes a 
warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.18 King 
moved to suppress the DNA evidence.19 His suppression motion was 
 
 6.  King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 554 (Md.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207). 
 7.  Id.  
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 552. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  DNA Collection Act, MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3) (West 2013). 
 12.  King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 552 (Md.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207). 
 13.  Brief of Petitioner at 4, Maryland v. King, No. 12-207 (U.S. Dec. 26, 2012). 
 14.  Congress authorized the FBI to establish a national database of DNA profiles of 
convicted persons. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-322, § 210304(a)(1)–(3), 108 Stat. 2069 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14132). Under 
this authority, the FBI created the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a coordinated 
system of federal, state, and local databases designed to permit participating law enforcement 
agencies to submit profiles and to search profiles within the compiled database. See CODIS 
Brochure, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis_brochure (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
 15.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 13, at 4.  
 16.  King, 42 A.3d at 553. 
 17.  Id. at 554. 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id.  
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denied, and on July 27, 2010, he was convicted of first-degree rape.20 
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland.21 The appeal was removed to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, which held that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to 
King and reversed King’s conviction.22 The State of Maryland 
appealed that decision to the United States Supreme Court.23 
Concerned with the impact the Maryland Court of Appeals’s 
holding could have on public safety initiatives, the State applied for a 
stay of judgment pending the Supreme Court’s disposition of the 
petition for writ of certiorari.24 Chief Justice Roberts granted the 
motion,25 finding: (1) “a reasonable probability” that the Court would 
grant certiorari; (2) “a fair prospect” that it would reverse the decision 
below; and (3) “a likelihood that irreparable harm [would] result from 
the denial of a stay.”26 
Looking to the first element, Roberts noted that approximately 
half of the states and the federal government have adopted similar 
statutes providing for DNA sampling and the compilation of DNA 
databases as a law enforcement tool;27 these various DNA databases 
are often checked against one another for matches.28 Roberts 
conveyed a concern that the decision below may decrease the 
effectiveness of other states’ DNA database systems and of the FBI’s 
federal database system.29 Thus, the case appeared to be a good 
candidate for a grant of certiorari. 
Jumping to the third element, Roberts noted that if Maryland was 
forced to shut down its DNA databases, even temporarily, irreparable 
harm was likely for two reasons.30 First, there is an inherent harm to 
the public interest when a State is enjoined from the application of a 
statute passed by the representatives of its people.31 Second, the 
 
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id. at 555. 
 22.  Id. at 581. 
 23.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (No. 12-207). 
 24.  Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration or Alternatively, for Stay of Enforcement of 
the Mandate, King v. Maryland, 42 A.3d 549 (Md. 2012) (No. 68). 
 25.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (granting the 
State of Maryland’s motion for stay of judgment). 
 26.  See Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers) 
(establishing the three elements required for a motion for stay to be granted).  
 27.  King, 133 S. Ct. at 2 (Roberts, C.J., in chambers).   
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 3. 
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decision below harms public safety interests because DNA sampling 
has empirically proven to be a valuable tool for Maryland law 
enforcement.32 Finally, as to the second element, Roberts concluded, 
without any elaboration, that there is a “fair prospect” that the 
Maryland Court of Appeals’s holding will be reversed.33 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Maryland DNA Collection Act 
In relevant part, the Maryland DNA Collection Act requires an 
individual charged with a crime of violence to submit a buccal swab.34 
Because Maryland’s forensic laboratory collaborates with the 
National DNA Index System (NDIS),35 extracted DNA samples are 
analyzed according to FBI standards.36 The material from the buccal 
swab is converted into a DNA profile unique to the owner of the 
sample through the following process: Under FBI standards, DNA is 
found on the chromosomes in the nuclei of the extracted cells.37 
Testing is done on parts of the chromosome referred to as loci.38 
 
 32.  See id. (“According to Maryland, from 2009—the year that Maryland began collecting 
samples from arrestees—to 2011, ‘matches from arrestee swabs [from Maryland] have resulted 
in 58 criminal prosecutions.’” (citation omitted)).  
 33.  Id. at 2. 
 34.  Under the Act, DNA samples may be collected from individuals charged with “[a] 
crime of violence,” “burglary,” or an attempt to commit either. DNA Collection Act, MD. 
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3) (West 2013). When the DNA sample is collected, the 
arrestee is to be informed that the DNA record “may be expunged and the DNA sample 
destroyed” in accordance with § 2-511. Id. DNA evidence that has been recovered from “a 
crime scene or collected as evidence of sexual assault at a hospital” is to be tested “as soon as 
reasonably possible” if a law enforcement investigator considers the evidence “relevant to the 
identification or exoneration of a suspect.” Id. 
 35.  NDIS is a subset of CODIS; NDIS contains all DNA profiles contributed by federal, 
state, and local participating forensic laboratories. States participating in NDIS must comply 
with the FBI standards of DNA testing and specific requirements for participation stipulated in 
the DNA Identification Act of 1994. See Frequently Asked Questions on the CODIS Program 
and the National DNA Index System, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 13, 2013) 
(citing DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14132). 
 36.  The DNA Identification Act of 1994 requires, among other things, that laboratories 
participating in NDIS must: (1) comply with the quality assurance standards issued by the FBI 
director; (2) be accredited by a nationally-recognized, nonprofit professional association of 
individuals actively engaged in forensic science; and (3) undergo an external audit every two 
years to confirm compliance with the FBI Director’s quality assurance standards. See DNA 
Identification Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132 (West 2013). 
 37.  See Frequently Asked Questions on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index 
System, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
 38.  DNA testing in conformance with FBI standards consists of using the polymerase 
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Thirteen loci were specifically chosen by the FBI for DNA analysis 
because they contain non-coding DNA, which the FBI believed did 
not include personal information such as medical susceptibilities and 
behavioral traits.39 Rather, the FBI thought that non-coding DNA 
revealed information “no more intimate than the particular blood 
serum enzyme that an individual happens to have, the pattern of 
blood vessels in the retina of the eye, or the whorls and ridges in a 
fingerprint.”40 
The resulting DNA profile is stored and collected along with 
others in Maryland’s DNA database.41 Because this collection is 
strictly regulated to follow FBI testing standards,42 Maryland is only 
permitted to gather “DNA records that directly relate to the 
identification of the individuals.”43 If an arrestee is not ultimately 
convicted, the Act requires that the DNA record be destroyed within 
sixty days.44 If the record is willfully not destroyed or misused, or if the 
DNA sample is tested in a manner not authorized by the Act, there 
are statutory penalties.45 
 
 
 
 
chain reaction (PCR) method, which replicates 13 core short-tandem-repeat (STR) loci. On the 
loci, short sequences of base pairs repeat themselves. The number of times the sequences repeat 
themselves varies from person to person. The DNA profile is represented as a numerical 
depiction of this information found on the loci. See id. 
 39.  See id.; accord MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1) (“Only DNA records that 
directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored.”). 
 40.  D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 455, 461–62 (2001). 
 41.  MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-501. 
 42.  See id. § 2-503(b) (“Each procedure adopted by the Director shall include quality 
assurance guidelines to ensure that DNA records meet standards and audit requirements that 
submit DNA records for inclusion in the statewide DNA data base system and CODIS.”); 
accord Storing Typing Results, MD. CODE REGS. 29.05.01.09(A) (2011) (“Blood, body fluid, or 
tissue samples shall be analyzed according to State Police protocol and standard operating 
procedures by personnel qualified under the FBI standards and CODIS requirements.”). 
 43.  MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1). 
 44.  Id. § 2-511. 
 45.  An individual is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment 
not exceeding five years or a fine not exceeding $5000 for committing any of the following 
violations: willfully accessing DNA information without authorization, willfully disclosing said 
information to others not authorized to receive it, and/or willfully testing the DNA sample for 
information that does not relate to identification. Id. § 2-512. If an individual willfully fails to 
destroy the DNA sample pursuant to an order to destroy it, she is guilty of a misdemeanor and 
on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding $1000. 
Id. 
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As originally enacted in 1994, the Act applied solely to convicted 
felons.46 The first Fourth Amendment challenge to the Act, State v. 
Raines,47 included a fact pattern strikingly similar to the one here, with 
one major divergence—the defendant was a convicted felon as 
opposed to an arrestee.48 However, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
upheld the Act as applied to convicted felons in light of their reduced 
expectation of privacy.49 The Act was amended in 2008 to include 
persons arrested for violent crimes among the class of individuals 
required to submit to DNA testing.50 
B. Fourth Amendment Analysis: The Focus on Reasonableness 
As a general rule, government searches must be authorized by 
judicial warrants issued on the basis of probable cause.51 However, the 
Supreme Court has effectively whittled away the warrant requirement 
over time.52 Today, in practice, the ex ante issuance of a warrant has 
become the exception as opposed to the rule, making Fourth 
Amendment analysis more often an ex post assessment of the 
reasonableness of the intrusion in question.53 
 
 
 
 46.  See Act of May 13, 2008, ch. 337, § 1, 2008 Md. Laws (codified as amended at MD. 
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3) (2008)) (amending MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-
504 to include arrestees of violent crimes in addition to convicted offenders). 
 47.  857 A.2d 19 (Md. 2004). 
 48.  See id. at 23 (framing the issue around the privacy interests of the convicted offender). 
 49.  Id. at 29. 
 50.  Act of May 13, 2008 § 1. The amended provision took effect on January 1, 2009 and 
will expire after December 31, 2013. Id. § 4. 
 51.  See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (“[W]e 
have often emphasized, and reiterate today, that a search must be supported, as a general 
matter, by a warrant issued upon probable cause.”). 
 52.  See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (noting the impracticality of the warrant 
requirement for certain police-civilian encounters and using a reasonableness test to assess 
whether the search/seizure violated the Fourth Amendment); see also Scott E. Sundby, A 
Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camera and Terry, 72 MINN. L. 
REV. 383, 393–94 (noting that Camara “reversed the roles of probable cause and 
reasonableness”: Prior to Camara, “[a] search or arrest was reasonable only when a warrant 
based on probable cause issued,” but after Camara “reasonableness, in the form of the 
balancing test, defined probable cause” (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 
(1967))). 
 53.  See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006) (“The touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.”); see also William J. Stuntz, 
Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 922 (1991) (noting that in 
contemporary practice, “warrants are presumptively required for searches of the home or office 
and for wiretaps, but not for anything else”). 
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The reasonableness of a warrantless administrative inspection54 is 
assessed using the “totality of the circumstances balancing test,” set 
forth in United States v. Knights,55 where the Supreme Court upheld a 
warrantless search of a probationer’s apartment.56 There, the Court 
held that the reasonableness of a search is determined by weighing 
“the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy” against 
“the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
government interests.”57 
One’s involvement with the criminal justice system informs one’s 
expectation of privacy. The Court has suggested a hypothetical 
spectrum, with a convicted individual on one end and an ordinary 
citizen58 on the other.59 The convicted offender’s privacy interests are 
at a minimum and the ordinary citizen’s privacy interests are at a 
maximum.60 Somewhere between these two points lie the probationer, 
the parolee, the pre-trial detainee, and presumably, the arrestee.61 In 
Knights, the Court held that the defendant’s expectation of privacy 
was diminished because of his status as a probationer.62 The Court 
 
 54.  Administrative searches include government searches of every person in a specific 
location or involved in a specific activity. These searches are not supported by probable cause or 
individualized suspicion; the reasonableness of the search is evaluated by balancing the 
competing interests. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1983) (holding that the 
warrant requirement was unsuitable for the maintenance of the swift disciplinary procedures 
needed in a school and assessing the reasonableness of the intrusion). “[C]ommon examples [of 
administrative searches] include checkpoints where government officials stop every car (or 
every third car) driving on a particular roadway, and drug testing programs that require every 
person involved in a given activity to submit to urinalysis.” Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling 
Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 262 (2011) (citations omitted). 
 55.  534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
 56.  Id. at 112–13 (observing the link between one’s privacy expectation and one’s 
placement on a “continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement . . . to a 
few hours of mandatory community service”). 
 57.  Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 58.  An “ordinary citizen” is an individual who has not entered the criminal justice system 
and consequently has no physical relationship to the State. 
 59.  See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (“In evaluating the degree of 
intrusion into Knights’ privacy, we found Knights’ probationary status ‘salient,’ observing that 
‘probation is one point . . . on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary 
confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 60.  See id. at 864 (“Threaded through the Court’s reasoning is the suggestion that 
deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights is part and parcel of any convict’s punishment.”). 
 61.  See id. (establishing that apprehended individuals with a physical relationship to the 
State have diminished privacy interests, yet they are situated along a continuum based on the 
seriousness of their physical relationship to the State). 
 62.  See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (2001) (“Inherent in the very nature of probation is that 
probationers ‘do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.’” (quoting 
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next held in Samson v. California63 that the parolee’s privacy interests 
are even less than those of the probationer because a parolee’s 
relationship to the State is comparatively more serious.64 
Sidling closer to addressing the privacy interests of arrestees, the 
Court addressed those of pre-trial detainees in Bell v. Wolfish.65 In 
Bell, the Court held that certain conditions pre-trial detainees endure, 
including visual body-cavity searches after a contact visit, do not 
infringe upon their privacy rights.66 Because administrative practices 
are deemed necessary for managing pre-trial detainees, their privacy 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment are necessarily 
reduced.67 Similarly, the Court’s holding in Florence v. Board of 
Chosen Freeholders68—that arrestees can be subjected to suspicionless 
strip searches before entering prison—implies that arrestees possess 
diminished privacy interests compared to those of ordinary citizens.69 
C. Federal Courts’ Assessment of DNA Testing Arrestees 
To date, only two federal circuit courts have addressed the issue of 
obtaining DNA samples from arrestees—the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Pool70 and the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit in United States v. Mitchell.71 In both cases, the courts 
employed the Knights balancing test to affirm the reasonableness of 
the warrantless DNA sampling of arrestees.72 
 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972))). 
 63.  547 U.S. 842 (2006). 
 64.  See id. at 843–44 (“Parolees, who are on the ‘continuum’ of state-imposed 
punishments, have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin 
to imprisonment than probation is.”). 
 65.  441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 66.  Id. at 558–60 (“Admittedly, this practice gives us the most pause. However, assuming 
for present purposes that inmates, both convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees, retain some 
Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections facility, we nonetheless conclude 
that these searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).  
 67.  See id. at 557 (“[A]ny reasonable expectation of privacy that a detainee retained 
necessarily would be of a diminished scope.” (citing Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 
(1962))). 
 68.  132 S. Ct. 1510 (2011). 
 69.  See id. at 1522 (“Even assuming all the facts in favor of petitioner, the search 
procedures at the Burlington County Detention Center and the Essex County Correctional 
Facility struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions.”). 
 70.  621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit voted to rehear Pool en banc, United 
States v. Pool, 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2011). While the en banc rehearing was pending, Pool 
pleaded guilty, and the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case as moot. United States v. Pool, 659 F.3d 
761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 71.  652 F.3d 387 (3rd Cir. 2011).  
 72.  See, e.g., id. at 403 (“We and the majority of circuits—the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
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In Pool, the defendant asserted a Fourth Amendment challenge to 
amendments of the Bail Reform Act, which required arrestees to 
provide a DNA sample as a condition of pre-trial release.73 The Ninth 
Circuit determined that the defendant’s privacy interests were 
reduced because of his arrestee status.74 The court applied the totality 
of the circumstances test to assess the reasonableness of compelling a 
DNA test from the defendant.75 Looking first to the degree of 
intrusion on the defendant’s privacy interests, the court dismissed the 
defendant’s argument that the information gathered from the sample 
could be used for purposes other than identification.76 By both design 
and law, the government had narrowed the scope of its DNA analysis 
to identifying the individual,77 and so the court would not speculate on 
potential government abuse.78 In contrast, the court found the State’s 
interests to be considerable.79 First, the State had a noted interest in 
using the most accurate means of identification available.80 The State 
also had a recognized interest in learning the criminal background of 
the arrestee to better determine whether the arrestee could be 
released before trial without posing a danger to society.81 The court 
found that the State’s interests outweighed the defendant’s privacy 
interest82 and thus held that the amendments to the Bail Reform Act 
 
Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia—have endorsed a totality of the 
circumstances approach.” (citations omitted)). 
 73.  Pool, 621 F.3d at 1215. 
 74.  See id. at 1219 (“[The magistrate] noted that at this point, ‘the defendant may be 
deprived of his very liberty . . . . Certainly the magistrate is correct that at this point the 
government may, through the judiciary, impose conditions on an individual that it could not 
otherwise impose on a citizen.” (citation omitted)).  
 75.  See id. at 1220 (“However, our opinions suggest that there may be a pre-requisite to 
the application of this [totality of the circumstances] test: there must be some legitimate reason 
for the individual having less than the full rights of a citizen.”). 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  See id. at 1221–22 (“If, . . . and when, some future program permits the parade of 
horribles the DNA Act’s opponents fear—unregulated disclosure of CODIS profiles to private 
parties, genetic discrimination, state-sponsored eugenics, . . . —we have confidence that courts 
will respond appropriately.”); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977) (assessing the 
constitutionality of the challenged statute based on what the statute explicitly provides for as 
opposed to speculations as to how the statue could be misapplied). 
 79.  Id. at 1222–23. 
 80.  See id. (“The government’s interests in DNA samples for law enforcement purposes 
are well established. It is the most accurate means of identification available.” (citing Dist. 
Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009))). 
 81.  See id. at 1225 (“In Pool’s case, the government seeks only his definitive identification 
which it relates to its ability to check on his activities while on pre-trial release.”). 
 82.  See id. at 1226 (“[W]here a court . . . [finds] probable cause . . . that the defendant 
committed a felony, the government’s interest in definitively determining the defendant’s 
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did not violate the Fourth Amendment.83 
In United States v. Mitchell, the defendant challenged the 2006 
revision to the federal DNA Act, which added arrestees and pretrial 
detainees to the class of individuals subject to DNA testing.84 
Applying the Knights balancing test,85 the Third Circuit found that the 
State’s interests outweighed those of the individual.86 Without much 
discussion, the court dismissed the argument that the procedure itself 
poses a significant physical intrusion.87 Next, the court noted that the 
extracted DNA material (referred to as “junk” DNA)88 used to create 
the DNA profile does not contain personal information such as 
medical conditions and predispositions.89 The Act sets strict guidelines 
limiting the use and purpose of the DNA samples to identification 
only.90 As for the State’s interests, the court recognized legitimate 
government interests in accurately identifying91 arrestees and aiding 
law enforcement in criminal investigations and prosecutions.92 Upon 
weighing the individual’s interests against the State’s interests, the 
Third Circuit determined that the balancing test tipped in favor of the 
State.93 
 
 
 
identity outweighs the defendant’s privacy interest in giving a DNA sample as a condition of 
pre-trial release where the government’s use of the DNA is limited . . . .”). 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  652 F.3d 387, 398–99 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 85.  United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 112–13 (2001). 
 86.  Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 413–15. 
 87.  See id. (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the ‘intrusion occasioned by a 
blood test is not significant, since such tests are commonplace . . . and that for most people the 
procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.’” (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989))). 
 88.  H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000) (stating that the “genetic markers [were] 
purposely selected because they are not associated with any known physical or medical 
characteristics, providing further assurance against the use of . . . DNA profiles for purposes 
other than law enforcement identification”).  
 89.  See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 401 (pointing out that the use of “junk” DNA ensures that the 
government is limited to attaining identification information from the sample, so it will not be 
privy to personal information).  
 90.  See id. at 403 (“The mere possibility of such misuse ‘can be accorded only limited 
weight in a balancing analysis that focuses on present circumstances.’” (quoting United States v. 
Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2007))). 
 91.  The court noted that identification includes ascertaining the arrestee’s criminal history. 
Id. at 413. 
 92.  Id. at 413–15. 
 93.  Id. at 416. 
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III. HOLDING 
In the Maryland Court of Appeals, Alonzo Jay King, Jr. brought 
both an as-applied challenge and a facial challenge to the Maryland 
DNA Collection Act.94 The court ruled in favor of King on the as-
applied challenge and rejected his facial challenge.95 First, the court 
addressed King’s claim that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to 
him because the first acquisition of his DNA sample was not based on 
any individualized suspicion.96 Unlike the convicted felon challenging 
the statute in Raines,97 King had a higher expectation of privacy.98 The 
court held that “the presumption of innocence cloaking the 
arrestee”—a presumption absent in Raines—was at the heart of the 
case.99 According to the court, until the arrestee is convicted, the 
presumption of innocence increases his expectation of privacy and 
correspondingly reduces the State’s interest.100 As a result, the court 
imposed upon the State “the burden of overcoming the arrestee’s 
presumption of innocence and his expectation to be free from 
biological searches before he is convicted of a qualifying crime.”101 
The court rejected the State’s argument that obtaining DNA 
samples was analogous to a routine booking procedure, such as 
fingerprinting;102 a buccal swab, by comparison, is more physically 
intrusive than fingerprinting.103 Furthermore, fingerprinting reveals 
only the physical characteristics of the individual for identification 
purposes.104 In contrast, a DNA sample contains what the court called 
 
 94.  King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 553 (Md.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207). 
 95.  Id. at 580. 
 96.  Id. at 553. 
 97.  See State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 23 (Md. 2004) (“The central issue dealing with the 
constitutionality of the Act is whether the collection of DNA from a certain class of convicted 
persons is in accord with the protections of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.”). 
 98.  See King, 42 A.3d at 577 (“Although arrestees do not have all the expectations enjoyed 
by the general public, the presumption of innocence bestows on them greater protections than 
convicted felons, parolees, or probationers.”). 
 99.  Id. at 563. 
 100.  See id. (“Here, however, the expectation of privacy of an arrestee renders the 
government’s purported interests in DNA collection reduced greatly.”). In making this point, 
the court presents no case law supporting the notion that there is a correlation betwee the two 
interests.  
 101.  Id. at 576. 
 102.  See id. at 574 (noting that even though fingerprinting has been de facto treated as a 
routine booking procedure without Fourth Amendment implications, the same approach does 
not necessarily apply to DNA sampling).   
 103.  See id. at 576 (“While the physical intrusion of a buccal swab is deemed minimal, it 
remains distinct from a fingerprint.”). 
 104.  See id. at 576–77 (“The information derived from a fingerprint is related only to 
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a “genetic treasure map,”105 giving the government unique access to an 
arrestee’s personal information.106 
The court found no compelling state interest sufficient to 
outweigh King’s expectation of privacy.107 The State had already 
confirmed King’s identity through other means, including 
fingerprinting and photographs.108 Although the State has a 
generalized interest in solving crimes, the court found that this 
interest did not outweigh King’s expectation of privacy.109 The court 
thus held that the Act, as applied to King, failed to survive Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny.110 However, King’s facial challenge failed 
because the court envisioned a conceivable context in which it would 
be appropriate for an arrestee to submit to a warrantless DNA test.111 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
The State of Maryland structures its argument according to the 
framework of the Knights balancing test, weighing King’s privacy 
interests against the State’s interests in collecting and analyzing DNA 
samples of arrestees.112 The State argues that King’s post-arrest search 
under the DNA Collection Act was reasonable and therefore not a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.113 
 
 
physical characteristics and can be used to identify a person, but no more.”). 
 105.  Id. at 577. 
 106.  Id. at 576–77. 
 107.  See id. at 577 (“Convicted felons are not at issue here. The greater expectation of 
privacy of an arrestee and the lesser legitimate interest of the State bring concerns about the 
privacy of genetic material to a different dynamic in the application of the balancing test.”). 
 108.  See id. at 579 (“[T]he State presented no evidence that it had any problems whatsoever 
identifying accurately King through traditional booking routines. King had been arrested 
previously, given earlier fingerprint samples, and had been photographed.”). 
 109.  See id. at 578 (“Although we have recognized . . . that solving cold cases is a legitimate 
governmental interest, a warrantless, suspicionless search can not [sic] be upheld by a 
‘generalized interest’ in solving crimes.”). 
 110.  Id. at 580. 
 111.  See id. (concluding that King’s facial challenge fails because identification through 
warrantless DNA testing would be reasonable if “an arrestee may have altered his or her 
fingerprints or facial features (making difficult or doubtful identification through comparison to 
earlier fingerprints or photographs on records)”). 
 112.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 13, at 12. 
 113.  Id. at 11. 
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1. An Assessment of the Arrestee’s Interests 
The State argues that a search authorized by the Act only 
minimally intrudes upon the arrestee’s privacy interest.114 The Act 
expressly prohibits the State from using the DNA samples to attain 
personal information.115 Supporting this argument is the premise that 
statutes should be assessed based on their plain language as opposed 
to speculative scenarios not provided for by the law.116 Therefore, 
King’s fear that the State could access sensitive information beyond 
the arrestee’s identification becomes immaterial when evaluating the 
constitutionality of the Act.117 
Furthermore, persons arrested for violent crimes generally have a 
reduced expectation of privacy.118 A lawful arrest alters one’s physical 
relationship to the State, thus one’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
correspondingly decreases.119 Because an arrestee has no legitimate 
expectation of anonymity,120 and because the Act primarily serves the 
purpose of identifying the arrestee,121 the Act serves a function that 
the arrestee is unable to evade.122 
 
 
 
 114.  Id. at 13–14. 
 115.  See id. at 15 (“When the Court of Appeals expressed concern about the disclosure of 
the ‘vast genetic treasure map’ of the human genome, it was ignoring the law as written. What is 
at issue in this case is not a search of King’s ‘genes,’ but rather a search for his identity.”). 
 116.  Id. at 14 (noting that an evaluation of the statute requires the court to not “go beyond 
the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 
552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008))). 
 117.  See id. at 15–16 (“The privacy interest at stake in this case is only in King’s identity, as 
expressed by a short and essentially random sequence of numbers engraved upon every living 
cell.”).  
 118.  See id. at 17 (“Lawful arrest fundamentally changes the nature of the individual’s 
physical relationship to the State, and correspondingly diminishes the individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”). 
 119.  Id. at 16–19; see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“A custodial 
arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth 
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional 
justification.”). 
 120.  See id. at 18 (“This Court has already ruled that there is no Fourth Amendment right 
to anonymity after being lawfully stopped by the police.” (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. 
Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004))). 
 121.  Id. at 14.  
 122.  See id. at 18 (“An arrestee may hope that his identity, and thus his participation in 
other crimes, goes undiscovered by the State. But ‘the mere expectation . . . that certain facts 
will not come to the attention of the authorities’ is not a privacy interest . . . ‘that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.’” (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 
(1984))).   
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Lastly, the State criticizes the Maryland Court of Appeals’ 
conclusion that the arrestee is cloaked with a presumption of 
innocence, which consequently increases the arrestee’s privacy 
interest.123 Because the presumption of innocence is part of the trial 
right to due process, it does not implicate the Fourth Amendment’s 
pre-trial application to arrestees.124 Consequently, it should have no 
bearing on the arrestee’s expectation of privacy.125 
2. An Assessment of the State’s Interests 
The State argues that it has a compelling interest in accurately 
identifying people within its custody126 and that DNA testing provides 
the most precise means for doing so.127 Unlike identification via 
fingerprinting or photographs, the immutability of a DNA profile 
makes it impossible to alter.128 Supervising pretrial detainees is 
another relevant state interest advanced by the Act.129 A 
comprehensive identification of pre-trial detainees, provided by DNA 
sampling, helps the State (1) determine whether the arrestee should 
be charged under recidivist statutes, (2) set bail, (3) make decisions on 
institutional security for detainees not released, and (4) set the terms 
of community supervision for those released.130 
Finally, the Act facilitates the State’s interest in solving crimes as 
efficiently as possible.131 It enables law enforcement to identify 
suspects with greater precision, conserve valuable state resources, and 
free those who are unjustifiably held as suspects from the scrutiny of 
the criminal justice system.132 It also helps to identify dangerous 
criminals who otherwise would not have been apprehended without 
 
 123.  Id. at 20–21. 
 124.  Id. at 20 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979)). 
 125.  Id. at 20–21 (“[T]he presumption of innocence has no application to a determination of 
the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 533)). 
 126.  See id. at 21–22 (“The 2008 extension of the Act to arrestees advances the State’s 
interest in accurately identifying people in its custody. King, like many . . . charged with crimes 
of violence, remained in state custody pending trial. The State clearly has an interest in knowing 
the identities of the people in its custody.”). 
 127.  See id. at 22 (“Not only is DNA analysis the best means of identification, it is 
immutable. King could give a false name; he could even change his appearance. But what King 
could not do is change the [twenty-six]-number sequence derived from his DNA.”). 
 128.  Id. at 23. 
 129.  Id. at 22. 
 130.  Id. at 22–23. 
 131.  Id. at 23. 
 132.  Id. at 23–25. 
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the aid of DNA sampling.133 
Having set all the aforementioned arguments on the scale, the 
State contends that its legitimate interests outweigh King’s minimal 
privacy interests.134 Hence, the State argues that obtaining King’s 
DNA after his arrest was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.135 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
King argues that the Act violates the Fourth Amendment by 
permitting the warrantless collection and analysis of DNA from an 
arrestee.136 King offers four primary arguments in support of his 
position: (1) His DNA test was not authorized by either a warrant or 
an individualized suspicion;137 (2) no existing exception to the warrant 
requirement was applicable;138 (3) DNA testing is not analogous to 
fingerprinting;139 and (4) his privacy interests outweigh any relevant 
government interests.140 
First, King notes the general requirement that searches141 are to be 
supported by a warrant obtained ex ante by a “neutral and detached 
magistrate.”142 The State not only failed to obtain a warrant to conduct 
this search, but it also lacked probable cause or individualized 
suspicion to link King to the rape of Vonette W. six years earlier.143 
Second, King argues that no existing exception to the warrant 
requirement applies.144 Exceptions to the warrant requirement include 
the “special needs” doctrine145 and the “search-incident-to-arrest” 
 
 133.  See id. at 25 (noting that “[t]he facts of this case dramatically underscore the value of 
expanding the database to include arrestees charged with violent crimes” because when King 
raped Vonette W. at gunpoint, “[h]e did not leave behind his photograph, his fingerprints, or his 
name—but he did leave his identity . . . in the form of a string of numbers engraved upon every 
cell.”). 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Brief for Respondent at 13, Maryland v. King, No. 12-207 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2013). 
 137.  Id. at 18–21. 
 138.  Id. at 34–38. 
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Id. at 46–54. 
 141.  In this case, a search was conducted when law enforcement extracted from King a 
DNA sample by means of a buccal swab. Id. at 18–19. 
 142.  Id. at 20. 
 143.  Id. at 20–21. 
 144.  Id. at 23. 
 145.  See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1986) (holding that 
roadblocks designed to identify drunk drivers on the road primarily served a public safety 
purpose, so the roadblocks did not violate the Fourth Amendment).  
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doctrine.146 The “special needs” doctrine applies when the primary 
purpose of the government activity extends beyond its general 
interest in crime control.147 King argues that crime control is the 
primary purpose of DNA testing arrestees because it solves unsolved 
crimes.148 The “search-incident-to-arrest” doctrine is also 
inapplicable.149 The doctrine allows police to remove weapons and 
search for evidence contemporaneous with the arrest to prevent 
concealment or destruction.150 King’s DNA was not evidence of the 
crime for which he was arrested.151 King further contends that there is 
no valid justification for creating a new exception to the warrant 
requirement for DNA testing.152 Even if DNA testing constitutes a 
minimal intrusion, and the State has a compelling interest in using 
precise testing procedures, these factors do not justify a departure 
from the warrant requirement.153 
Third, King argues that DNA testing is not a justified extension of 
routine booking procedures like fingerprinting.154 He argues that 
fingerprinting does not involve an intrusion below the body surface,155 
so it is not as physically intrusive as DNA testing and therefore 
infringes less upon an individual’s privacy.156 Fourth and finally, King 
argues that if the Court conducts a balancing test, it should find that 
his privacy interests outweigh those of the State.157 The intrusive 
nature of DNA testing—both physically and in terms of the amount 
of information accessible to the government—tips the scale in his 
favor.158 Though King acknowledges that FBI standards prohibit 
certain personal information from being extracted from the DNA 
 
 146.  See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (holding that pursuant to 
a lawful arrest, police can search everything associated with the arrestee’s person assuming that 
there might be a weapon). 
 147.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 136, at 28; see, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 
532 U.S. 67, 83–84 (2001) (holding that the “special needs” doctrine did not apply because the 
public health rationale for prosecuting mothers whose infants tested positive for cocaine was too 
closely entangled with a crime control purpose).  
 148.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 136, at 28. 
 149.  Id. at 33–34. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  See id. at 34 (“[I]t is undisputed that the [S]tate did not conduct the DNA testing to 
link respondent to the alleged assault.”).  
 152.  Id. at 38. 
 153.  Id. at 40–42. 
 154.  Id. at 34–38. 
 155.  Id. at 35. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 45–54. 
 158.  Id. at 45. 
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material examined,159 he argues that the State does not account for the 
possibility that future scientific advancement will expand the 
significance of the specific loci selected beyond mere identification.160 
For these reasons, King argues that the DNA testing was 
unreasonable and therefore constitutes a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.161 
V. ANALYSIS 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion granting the State of Maryland’s 
motion for a stay of judgment suggests that the Supreme Court will 
ultimately overturn the Maryland Court of Appeals’s holding.162 To 
grant the stay, Roberts had to find: (1) “a reasonable probability” that 
the Court would grant certiorari; (2) “a fair prospect” that it would 
reverse the decision below; and (3) “a likelihood that irreparable 
harm [would] result from the denial of stay.”163 The first two elements 
“[b]oth depend on an individual Justice’s predictions not only of how 
he will vote on a future certiorari petition or rule on the merits after 
full consideration of a case, but also on how he thinks each of the 
other Justices will react.”164 Though Roberts alone granted the stay, in 
so doing he was obliged to act “as a surrogate for the entire Court” 
and to reach a decision that would “reflect the views of a majority of 
the sitting Justices.”165 
In granting the stay, Roberts likely concluded that the majority of 
the sitting Justices would overturn the lower court’s decision and 
uphold the Act. There are at least three possible approaches the Court 
could take to find the Act constitutional. First, the Court could 
recognize that King’s privacy interests are diminished because of his 
arrestee status. Second, the Court could focus on the fact that the 
arrestee has no right to anonymity, so the Act, which is limited to 
 
 159.  See id. at 46 (“[W]hile it is true that the loci at issue were initially selected because it 
was believed that they did not correspond to any particular traits or characteristics, the scientific 
understanding is rapidly evolving . . . .”). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 53–54. 
 162.  See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers). 
 163.  See Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers) 
(outlining the three elements required for a motion for stay to be granted). 
 164.  Lois J. Scali, Comment, Prediction-Making in the Supreme Court: The Granting of 
Stays by Individual Justices, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1020, 1032 (1985). 
 165.  See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1313 (1973) (Marshall, Circuit Justice) 
(“[W]hen I sit in my capacity as a Circuit Justice, I act not for myself alone but as a surrogate for 
the entire Court . . . . A Circuit Justice therefore bears a heavy responsibility to conscientiously 
reflect the views of his Brethren . . . .”). 
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identifying arrestees only, does not infringe on any legitimate privacy 
expectation. Third, the Court could explicitly clarify that an 
assessment of an individual’s privacy interests revolves primarily 
around the physical intrusiveness of DNA testing. This way, the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis of DNA testing will not depend 
entirely on whether the science of “junk” DNA evolves. 
A. Calibrating the Scale 
The balancing test used to determine the reasonableness of a 
Fourth Amendment intrusion weighs the individual’s privacy interests 
against the State’s interests in conducting the search.166 The Court 
could explicitly conclude that an arrestee’s privacy interest is reduced 
due to her status as an arrestee. As Knights illustrated, one’s privacy 
interests are informed by one’s physical relationship to the State.167 In 
Knights, because of the defendant’s reduced expectation of privacy 
due to his probationer status, the State’s interest in decreasing 
recidivism outweighed the defendant’s interests.168 If the Court takes a 
similar approach here, it need not be exact about the extent to which 
the arrestee’s privacy interests are reduced. Rather, it would suffice to 
determine that the arrestee’s privacy interests are reduced just 
enough to make the State’s interests in DNA sampling greater than 
those of the arrestee’s.169 
Additionally, the Court may highlight the value of the safeguards 
and expungement provisions in the Act. In so doing, the Court would 
stress that the Act enables DNA sampling of arrestees solely for 
identification purposes. Safeguards include adhering to FBI standards 
of collecting and analyzing DNA samples,170 namely using the specific 
genetic loci the FBI has identified as optimal for maintaining a 
 
 166.  United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001). 
 167.  See id. at 119 (“Just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender’s 
freedoms, a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the 
offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”). 
 168.  See id. at 120 (noting that a major reason why probationers have diminished privacy 
interests in comparison to ordinary citizens is because of the fear that they are more likely to 
violate the law).  
 169.  See Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust 
between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1765 (1994) (“[I]f resolving a clash 
of rights is simply a playing of each actor’s rights card and deciding which right is more valuable, 
the government’s card . . . almost always will outweigh an individual’s claim of a right to privacy, 
especially where the intrusion can be characterized as minimal.”). 
 170.  DNA Collection Act, MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-503 (West 2013); accord id. § 
2-502(c)(3). 
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database system.171 This way, the State gains only the information it 
requires for identification purposes.172 The Act also includes 
provisions expressing limitations on where the samples are to be 
located,173 who is granted access to these samples,174 and the purposes 
for which the samples can be used.175 These provisions provide 
security after the samples are attained to ensure that they are not 
misused.176 Finally, the Act requires the destruction of the DNA 
information if “a criminal action begun against the individual . . . does 
not result in a conviction of the individual, the conviction is finally 
reversed or vacated and no new trial is permitted, or the individual is 
granted an unconditional pardon.”177 
Admittedly, despite these safeguard provisions the potential for 
abuse remains. However, the Court has previously found in Whalen v. 
Roe178 that the risk of abuse leading to the potential misuse of 
personal information is insufficient to invalidate a database or other 
stipulations codified in a statute.179 By focusing on the safeguard 
provisions, the Court can recognize that the combination of these 
precautionary requirements limit the utility of the sample analysis to 
identification of the arrestee, which the arrestee cannot conceal from 
the State.180 If the Court uses the safeguards and expungement 
provisions to characterize the Act as accomplishing nothing more 
than identifying lawfully arrested individuals, the Court can conclude 
 
 171.  See Kaye, supra note 40, at 461–62. 
 172.  Shortly after remarking on the unsolved murders and rapes that can be solved by this 
DNA technology, Justice Alito questioned why DNA is not the fingerprinting of the twenty-first 
century. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Maryland v. King, No. 12-207 (U.S. argued Feb. 26, 
2013) (Alito, J.). 
 173.  MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(b). 
 174.  Id. § 2-504(c). 
 175.  Id. § 2-505. 
 176.  See, e.g., id. § 2-502(c)(4) (providing that the Crime Laboratory Director shall “ensure 
the security and confidentiality of all records in the statewide DNA data base system”). 
 177.  Id. § 2-511(a)(1)(i)–(iii). 
 178.  429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 179.  See id. at 603 (holding that a New York law requiring physicians to file prescriptions 
with the Department of Health so the Department could maintain a computerized database of 
the information, including the patient’s name, was constitutional despite the inescapable risk 
that the database could be misused); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Maryland v. 
King, No. 12-207 (U.S. argued Feb. 26, 2013) (Alito, J.) (“[W]here a urine sample is taken to 
determine drug use, the urine can be analyzed for all sorts of things . . . and . . . this is a 
reasonable search with respect to the determination of whether the person has taken drugs, not 
all the other information.”). 
 180.  See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984) (“The concept of an interest in 
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically 
different from the mere expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to 
the attention of the authorities.”).  
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that concealment of identification is not a recognized privacy 
interest.181 At the very least, it is not a privacy interest that elevates 
the arrestee’s interests above the State’s. 
The State’s interests are undoubtedly substantial. They include 
aiding law enforcement within Maryland by resolving previously 
unsolved crimes,182 aiding law enforcement efforts of other states and 
of the FBI,183 releasing wrongfully held suspects exonerated by DNA 
hits, using the most precise means of identification available, and 
adding efficiency to the criminal justice system.184 These interests are 
particularly palpable in this case: After other avenues had failed,185 the 
perpetrator of a previously unsolved rape was discovered six years 
later through Maryland’s DNA database system.186 Hence, when the 
arrestee’s reduced privacy interests are weighed against the various 
state interests in attaining DNA samples of arrestees, the Court may 
face minimal difficulty establishing that the balance weighs in favor of 
the State’s interests. The fact that Chief Justice Roberts finds it 
disconcerting that Maryland will be deprived of this law enforcement 
tool, even for a temporary period, suggests that there is some support 
on the Court for recognizing the weight of the government interests 
involved.187 
 
 181.  See Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1280–81 (2012) (“As 
identifying information is a set of facts, a suspect can rarely, if ever, claim that such information 
contains original expressive content. Consequently, individuals have only a privacy interest in 
the seclusion of identifying information, but not in its secrecy.”). 
 182.  Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley made a statement supporting the expansion of 
the Act to include DNA testing of arrestees “to more efficiently resolve open criminal 
investigations, pursue repeat offenders, and save valuable time pursuing false leads by 
effectively eliminating suspects from ongoing investigations.” Press Release, Office of the 
Governor of Maryland, O’Malley Testifies on Proposal to Improve Public Safety (Feb. 13, 2008) 
(on file with author). 
 183.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers). 
 184.  See Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 
(2009) (“DNA testing has an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and 
to identify the guilty.”); id. (“DNA testing . . . has the potential to significantly improve both the 
criminal justice system and police investigative practices.”). 
 185.  The victim was unable to identify her attacker because he covered his face with a ski 
mask. Furthermore, he left no fingerprint marks. The only trace left behind was a sample of his 
semen recovered from the victim in the hospital. King v. Maryland, 42 A.3d 549, 555. 
 186.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 13, at 25. 
 187.  See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2012) (Robert, C.J., in chambers) (expressing 
concern that if the DNA testing is discontinued pursuant to the Maryland Court of Appeals 
decision, severe repercussions will be suffered by the public, the State, other states that rely on 
similar databases, and the national database system). But see Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, 
Maryland v. King, No. 12-207 (U.S. argued Feb. 26, 2013) (Scalia, J.) (responding to the 
empirics the State presented on the efficacy of the Act, Scalia said, “I’ll bet you, if you 
conducted a lot of unreasonable searches and seizures, you’d get more convictions too . . . . That 
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B. The Evolving Science on “Junk” DNA 
The Encyclopedia of DNA Elements (ENCODE), a project 
funded by the Human Genome Research Institute, presented new 
data in 2012 revealing that “junk” DNA may be a misnomer.188 
According to the ENCODE team, what was thought to be “junk” 
DNA turns out to be biochemically active material that regulates the 
expression of genes and controls hundreds of common diseases.189 
Even though Maryland’s DNA database follows the FBI standards of 
testing the specific loci identified as “junk” DNA,190 ENCODE’s data 
suggests that the information the government can access from the 
sample is not limited to identification. If ENCODE has correctly 
unveiled the true nature of what was previously considered biological 
dark matter, the government can gain access to personal information 
from DNA samples, including medical susceptibilities and conditions. 
Although this new development may create a sensation in the 
world of human genome research, it is not as monumental for Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness analysis, because the reasonableness 
analysis is not driven by the nature of the information being accessed 
by law enforcement. The reasonableness analysis has instead focused 
on the degree of the physical intrusiveness of the search.191 Professor 
Nita Farahany elaborates: “Because an individual cannot claim 
authorship over her biometric data, seclusion is the only recognized 
privacy interest that these searches could implicate. When seclusion is 
 
proves absolutely nothing”). 
 188.  See The ENCODE Project Consortium, An Integrated Encyclopedia of DNA Elements 
in the Human Genome, NATURE (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v489 
/n7414/full/nature11247.html. 
 189.  See id. (“These data enabled us to assign biochemical functions for 80% of the genome 
. . . providing new insights into the mechanisms of gene regulation. The newly identified 
elements also show a statistical correspondence to sequence variants linked to human disease . . 
. .”). 
 190.  See Storing Typing Results, MD. CODE REGS. 29.05.01.09(A) (2011) (“Blood, body 
fluid, or tissue samples shall be analyzed according to State Police protocol and standard 
operating procedures by personnel qualified under the FBI standards and CODIS 
requirements.”). 
 191.  Farahany, supra note 181, at 1282. Farahany points out that searches of identifying 
information, like biometric data, involve the search of information not authored by the 
individual whose sample is attained. Id. Accordingly, that individual has no privacy interest in 
the information contained therein, so the relevant question in conducting a privacy inquiry 
revolves around the physical intrusiveness of the search. Id. The Court has almost always 
focused on the physical nature of the intrusion as opposed to focusing on the nature of the 
information to which the government gains access. Id.; see also, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (assessing the reasonableness of governmentally 
imposed urine tests by focusing on the intrusiveness of the procedure as opposed to focusing on 
the extent of information accessible from the samples attained). 
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the sole cognizable interest at stake, the physical intrusiveness of the 
search governs its reasonableness.”192 Because the physical 
intrusiveness of the search is at the heart of the privacy inquiry,193 
revelations about the type of information certain loci reveal become 
immaterial.194 As long as the actual procedure of DNA testing 
constitutes a de minimis intrusion, the State’s interests will outweigh 
the individual’s privacy interests. 
Here, the search consisted of rubbing a cotton swab against the 
inside of the arrestee’s cheek.195 The Court has already determined 
that more intrusive procedures involving the use of needles to attain 
samples below the body surface do not compromise bodily integrity 
to an inordinate degree.196 In comparison, the buccal swab is 
minimally intrusive, so King’s privacy interests are not considerably 
weighty in comparison to the State’s interests. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is something unsettling about the notion of the government 
accessing a bodily sample that has the potential to reveal more about 
an individual than the scientific community currently contemplates. 
Surely the ENCODE project’s discovery does not mark the apex of 
our understanding of the contents of our DNA material. The lack of 
confidence in what exactly the government can access when it collects 
DNA animates King’s argument that the Act empowers the 
government too generously. His concern triggers a recurring question 
in Fourth amendment jurisprudence—how much should citizens trust 
law enforcement to act reasonably and do the right thing? The 
speculative nature of what exactly this DNA material conveys to the 
government might differentiate this case from other cases involving 
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 193.  See id. at 1265 (“[W]hether a search reveals a soccer ball or a sex tape, the seclusion 
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 194.  In oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts considered the hypothetical individual who 
leaves behind her DNA by sipping a glass of water. He suggested that the fact that DNA 
material is easily and unconsciously shed may also inform an individual’s expectation of privacy 
over her DNA material. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Maryland v. King, No. 12-207 
(U.S. argued Feb. 26, 2013) (Roberts, C.J.) (“[DNA] is not something that people are or can 
keep private.”). 
 195.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 13, at 4. 
 196.  See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (“[Extraction of blood 
samples is] commonplace in these days of periodic physical examination and experience with 
them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the 
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biometric information. Maryland v. King presents the Court with an 
opportunity to consider more than just physical intrusiveness when 
assessing the reasonableness of the search. The Court can also 
contemplate what level of privacy protections, if any, should extend to 
the individual’s informational secrecy. The Court has the chance to 
expand the individual’s privacy interests to encompass a secrecy 
interest in shielding identifying attributes. Nonetheless, the Court will 
likely conform to past precedents by assessing the reasonableness of 
DNA testing according to the physical intrusiveness of the procedure. 
In so doing, the Supreme Court will likely find Maryland’s DNA 
Collection Act constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and 
reverse the lower court’s decision. 
 
